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INTRODUCTION
The rising costs of litigation have impacted those involved in healthcarerelated cases—including patients, providers, the courts, and lawyers. 1
Litigation costs have increased malpractice insurance rates for providers,
and have increased the risk for malpractice attorneys on both sides of the
aisle. 2 Not surprisingly, there is debate about how to control these rampant
expenses. 3 The situation has even caused legislatures to craft statutory costcutting solutions, many of which have been arguably ineffective. 4
One practice that may mitigate rising costs and save money for all parties
involved is to allow ex parte interviews of treating physicians. 5 Scheduling
formal depositions in complex healthcare-related cases often composes a
substantial portion of the litigation expenses. 6 Ex parte interviews allow
attorneys to reduce the number of formal depositions and gather relevant
information and thereby lower costs significantly. 7 While these interviews
could be helpful in any civil case where a medical condition is at issue, ex
parte interviews are most important in medical malpractice cases where
lawyers use physician testimony both to explain issues of medical causation
and damages, and to determine whether the defendant conformed to the
applicable professional standard of care. 8
Any time ex parte is mentioned, controversy ensues. Ex parte interviews
of treating physicians are no exception. Courts are split on the question of
regulating these interviews, which has created a confusing legal framework

1. John Angle, GOP-Proposed Tort Reform Would Reduce HealthCare Cost,
Analysts Say, FOXNEWS (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2010/03/03/gop-proposed-tort-reform-reduce-health-care-costs-analysts-say/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Mitchell J. Nathanson, It’s the Economy (and Combined Ratio), Stupid:
Examining the Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to
Reform, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1077, 1077-78 (2004) (discussing how statutory fixes to
medical malpractice have been ineffective in cutting litigation costs); Judd v. Drezga, 103
P.3d 135, 139-40 (Utah 2004) (discussing medical malpractice cost-cutting solutions).
5. See John Jennings, Note, The Physician-Patient Relationship: The Permissibility
of Ex-Parte Communications Between Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians and Defense
Counsel, 59 MO. L. REV. 441, 458 (1994).
6. Id. at 476; Rebecca White Berch, A Proposal to Amend Rule 30(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Cross-Disciplinary and Empirical Evidence Supporting
Presumptive Use of Video to Record Depositions, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 382 (1990)
(discussing costs of depositions in general).
7. Jennings, supra note 5, at 458.
8. Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking
Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 700-01 (2002).
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at both the state and federal level. 9 Nearly every state and many federal
courts differ in how to regulate ex parte interviews with physicians—or
whether they are even permitted. 10 Some state and federal courts completely
ban the practice, while other courts allow ex parte interviews only in certain
circumstances—and still other courts impose no special restrictions. 11 About
half of the states permit ex parte interviews of treating physicians while the
other half generally disallow the practice. 12 Federal courts are similarly
conflicted. 13 Careful review of relevant case law, state statutes, and
legislative records is needed to determine if a defense lawyer may interview or
contact a treating physician for a formal deposition; and even then, the answer
may still be unclear.
Additionally, the unresolved legal issues create challenges for treating
physicians who must respond to interview requests. 14 Plaintiffs also have an

9.
10.
11.

Jennings, supra note 5, at 454.
Id. at 454-56.
See Wade v. Vabnick-Wener, 922 F. Supp. 2d 679, 691 (W.D. Tenn. 2010)
(applying Tennessee law and holding that defense counsel ex parte contacts are
prohibited); Horner v. Rowan Cos., 153 F.R.D. 597, 598 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (banning ex
parte contact unless plaintiff is given reasonable notice); Benally v. United States, 216
F.R.D. 478, 480 (D. Ariz. 2003) (banning all ex parte contacts by defense counsel with
treating physicians); Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30, 35-36 (Mich. 1991) (referring to
ex parte interviews as “routine practice” and facilitating litigation); Flamma v. Atlantic
City Fire Dep’t, 573 A.2d 158, 161 (N.J. 1990) (noting that no rule exists prohibiting an
attorney in a disciplinary hearing from communicating with an adverse witness);
Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857, 862, 864 (N.J. 1985) (“Personal interviews . . . are an
accepted, informal method of assembling facts and documents in preparation for trial.”);
Ethics Digest, 16 PA. LAW. 10 ¶ 94-48 (Sept. 1994) (commenting that the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct do not prohibit an attorney representing a seller in litigation to
communicate with a witness subpoenaed by the other party so long as the subpoenaed
witness is not represented by counsel).
12. Melissa Phillips Reading & Laura Marshall Strong, Has HIPAA Really Changed
the Landscape?, 53 FOR THE DEF. 30, 31-33 (2011).
13. For example, two three-judge panels in the Ninth Circuit held that ex parte
contact with an adverse expert is impermissible. See Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d
298, 302 (9th Cir. 1996); Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir.
1980); see also Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Md. Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D. Mass.
1987) (noting that even a “critical” witness may be interviewed ex parte); United States
ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1288, 1293-94 (E.D. Mo.
1997). However, some courts have also found ex parte communications with treating
physicians permissible. See, e.g., Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D. 85, 91 (D.S.C. 1991)
(“Private interviews by attorneys have been recognized as a ‘time-honored’ method for
conducting discovery.”). The District of Columbia permits ex parte communication.
Sklagen v. Greater Se Cmty. Hosp., 625 F. Supp. 991, 992 (D.D.C. 1984); Doe v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1983).
14. See Jennings, supra note 5, at 457.
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obvious interest in a solution as ex parte interviews clearly involve the
patient privilege and other rights. 15
This article explores the issue of defense counsel ex parte interviews 16
with treating physicians, and proposes a resolution to standardize the
practice that is equitable for all parties involved. Courts and legal scholars
have commonly recognized that treating physicians in personal injury
litigation are usually fact witnesses, albeit with special expertise, and allow
plaintiffs unfettered access while defendants are relegated to a formal
deposition which creates a fundamental imbalance in informational power. 17
Moreover, there are significant arguments raised by the defense bar
concerning efficiency and fairness. 18 However, allowing defense counsel
unlimited and unregulated access to treating physicians creates clear risks—
particularly the danger that doctors might inadvertently disclose privileged
information. 19
Section I explores the threshold question of whether the interviews are
outright prohibited by existing laws. Many courts and litigants suggest
certain statutes or common law principles restrict or prohibit ex parte
defense interviews altogether. Most notable are the patient-physician
privilege and other confidentiality rules, as well as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). 20 Section I concludes
that, while these doctrines may be relevant to regulate ex parte interviews,
they certainly do not prevent courts and legislatures from permitting them.
Section II discusses the law regulating ex parte defense interviews across
both the federal and state systems. The current state of the law across
jurisdictions is inconsistent and often confusing. Jurisdictions vary widely
15.
16.

Id. at 465 (discussing the effect of waiver on the privilege relationship).
This article uses the term “ex parte defense interviews” to refer to defense
counsel ex parte interviews of treating physicians.
17. See Jennings, supra note 5, at 475; see also Thomas v. 1156729 Ontario Inc., 979
F. Supp. 2d 780, 785 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
18. Horner v. Rowan Cos., 153 F.R.D. 597, 600 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
19. See Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986):
[T]he public…has the right to rely on physicians to adhere to medical ethics and
thereby protect the confidential relationship existing between a patient and his
physicians . . .[and] ex parte conferences between a patient’s treating physician
and the patient’s legal adversary threaten that confidential relationship in that
they involve the discussion of a patient’s medical confidences without the
patient’s consent. That being the case, it is apparent that ex parte conferences
are contrary to public policy for they place in jeopardy an established and
beneficial interest of society, namely, the confidential relationship existing
between a patient and his physician.
Id.
20. HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and
42 U.S.C.).
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on whether ex parte interviews are allowed and jurisdictions that permit ex
parte communications often have unclear rules for litigants. 21 Inconsistency
and confusion emerge from assumptions made about the effects of the
doctrines discussed in Section I, or from arguments based on conflicting
policy grounds. 22 For example, many jurisdictions prohibit ex parte
communications based on assumptions concerning the patient-physician
privilege. Section II ends by using Nevada as an example of a jurisdiction
with a confusing maze of rules based on unclear and potentially inapplicable
grounds.
Section III attempts to wade through the policy arguments raised by
various authorities in support of the methods each has used to regulate ex
parte defense interviews. The purpose of analyzing the policies behind
different approaches is for courts and legislatures to make informed
decisions when regulating defense counsel treating physician interviews.
Finally, the authors propose a comprehensive, uniform approach to
regulating ex parte defense interviews. This solution attempts to balance the
policy arguments raised by both sides of the bar as well as the courts.
Ultimately, this article does not suggest a perfect means of regulating
these interviews. Rather, the authors urge legislatures and courts to consider
the policy arguments raised by both sides of the bar when crafting a solution.
Finally, and most important, legislatures and courts should create a measure
of uniformity and clarity in this area by adopting a balanced, consistent
mechanism for regulating ex parte defense counsel interviews.
A. The Current State of the Law on Ex Parte Defense Interviews
State courts, federal courts, and legislatures, all approach ex parte defense
interviews in a myriad of ways—leaving litigants lost when determining
whether to conduct one of these interviews. 23 Moreover, it is often unclear
what policy rationale courts and legislatures use when making their
regulatory decisions in this area. 24
Choice of law implications 25 complicate the issue as federal courts
disagree about whether a state’s application of its substantive privilege law
21. Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443, 444-45 (D.N.D. 1981); Stempler v. Speidell,
495 A.2d 857, 862-64 (N.J. 1985).
22. See Jennings, supra note 5, at 454-59.
23. Ronald A. Parsons, Jr. & Shannon R. Falon, Ex Parte Contacts Revisited, 58
S.D. L. REV. 273, 273-74 (2013).
24. J. Christopher Smith, Recognizing the Split: The Jurisdictional Treatment of
Defense Counsel’s Ex Parte Contact with Plaintiff’s Treating Physician, 23 J. LEG. PROF.
247, 251-52 (1999); Jennings, supra note 5, at 456-59.
25. Depending on a court’s jurisdiction, the applicable privilege law will vary. See
FED. R. EVID. 501. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, federal courts should permit
testimonial privilege governed by the principles of the federal common law “as they may
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binds federal courts hearing a case under diversity jurisdiction. 26 Some
federal courts interpret state privilege law as either prohibiting or permitting
the interviews. 27 Even when federal courts apply federal law, they treat ex
parte defense counsel interviews inconsistently. 28 Most federal courts allow
ex parte defense counsel interviews when applying federal law largely
because informal discovery techniques are well-accepted and no federal rule
specifically prohibits the activity. 29 However, some federal courts have held
the opposite: that the absence of a rule permitting the interviews prohibits
them. 30

be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.”
Id. Interviews can arise within a federal question case, where federal common law under
Rule 501 provides the applicable privilege law. Id.; see also H.R. REP. 93-650, at 8
(1974) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that “privileges shall . . . be developed by the courts of the
United States under a uniform standard applicable both in civil and criminal cases.”);
H.R. REP. 93-1597, at 7 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that “[i]n nondiversity
jurisdiction civil cases, federal privilege law will generally apply”). Thus, in a federal
question case, because there is no rule explicitly permitting or prohibiting an ex parte
defense interview, whether such an interview is permitted is a question of federal
common law. Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 355 (6th Cir. 1998). Alternatively, an ex
parte defense interview may occur in a diversity case, where the federal court must apply
state privilege law. FED. R. EVID 501 cmt. (requiring “state privilege law will usually
apply in diversity cases.”); Weiss v. Astellas Pharma, US, Inc., No. 05-527 JMH, 2007
WL 2137782, *3-4 (E.D. Ky. July 23, 2007) (discussing interplay of state and federal law
regarding ex parte defense interviews).
26. In federal diversity cases where courts must apply state privilege law, courts
disagree about whether ex parte defense interviews should be banned even if interviews
are not statutorily banned under state law, but where the state common law has
affirmatively banned ex parte defense interviews. See generally Filz v. Mayo Found.,
136 F.R.D. 165, 167, 174 (D. Minn. 1991); Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D. 85, 87–91
(D.S.C. 1991) (interpreting South Carolina privilege law to allow ex parte interviews).
27. Benally v. United States, 216 F.R.D. 478, 480-81 (D. Ariz. 2003) (prohibiting ex
parte defense interviews as the court interpreted the physician-patient privilege to exclude
interviews as a matter of public policy).
28. See Michael Duvall, Resolving Intra-Circuit Splits in the Federal Courts of
Appeal, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 17, 17 (2009). Compare State ex rel. Proctor v. Messina,
320 S.W.2d 145, 154-55 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) with Holmes v. Nightingale, 158 P.3d
1039, 1047 (Okla. 2007).
29. Benally, 216 F.R.D. at 480 (citing Filz, 136 F.R.D. 165); see Felder, 139 F.R.D.
at 91 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not prohibit ex parte
communication).
30. E.g., Neubeck v. Lundquist, 186 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D. Me. 1999) (holding that
defendants must remain within the strictures of the “formal mechanisms of discovery
provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure absent the express consent of a
plaintiff”).
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States use a variety of mechanisms to control ex parte defense interviews.
Some states explicitly ban the practice, 31 while others explicitly permit the
practice with certain limitations. 32 For example, Michigan permits a
defendant (or his representative) in a medical malpractice action to
“communicate” with persons or entities with respect to whom the plaintiff
has waived the physician-patient privilege “in order to obtain all information
relevant to the subject matter of the claim or action and to prepare the
person’s or entity’s defense to the claim or action.” 33 The statute also
clarifies that a person who discloses such information “does not violate [the
statutory patient-privilege] or any other similar duty or obligation created by
law and owed to the claimant or plaintiff.” 34 However, even these statutory
schemes can be ambiguous. For example, litigants argue that the Michigan
disclosure rule was only meant to reach written disclosures. 35 Even in
jurisdictions with apparently clear patient-disclosure rules 36 on point,
confusion exists about when ex parte interviews are permitted, if at all. 37
31. E.g., IOWA CODE § 622.10(1)-(3) (2012) (not allowing disclosure of confidential
communication unless privilege holder voluntarily waives the confidentiality privilege);
MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(d), (5) (2010) (prohibiting physicians from disclosing
information relating to patient treatment or their medical opinion unless the patient files
suit against a healthcare provider for malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure, then a
patient waives privilege).
32. Idaho’s Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(4), explicitly prohibits ex parte
contact with an adverse expert retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 26.b.4(A)(1)(v)(3). However, a treating physician does not
fall under Rule 26.b.4(A)(3) as the rule prohibits or limits discovery of expert opinion
developed for litigation and the rule does not explicitly exclude expert opinion not
developed for litigation. Clark v. Raty, 48 P.3d 672, 674-75 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002). The
New York legislature proposed a similar rule:
Ex-parte interviews: In any action involving personal injury, medical, dental, or
podiatric malpractice or wrongful death, no party or anyone acting on behalf of
a party may either directly or indirectly conduct ex-parte interviews with the
treating physicians or other health care providers of any other party. Nothing in
this subdivision shall prohibit an attorney or the agent or employee of an
attorney who represents the patient, the estate of the patient, or the natural or
duly appointed guardian of the patient whose condition is at issue in the action
from conducting ex-parte conversations with a treating physician or other health
care provider of the patient.
N.Y. Gen. Assemb. A00964A, 234th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011). .
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.291f(2) (2014).
34. Id. § 600.291f(3).
35. Gibson v. Bronson Methodist Hosp., 517 N.W.2d 736, 737-38 (Mich. 1994)
(citing MICH. CT. R. 2.314(B)(1)).
36. See Jennings, supra note 5, at 461 n.106 (naming the states that have statutes
allowing for disclosure after a lawsuit has been filed).
37. It also remains unclear what information is “relevant” in terms of medical history
under the Michigan Statutory scheme. Nevada law, discussed in detail infra, has a
legislative scheme permitting disclosure of patient information during an ongoing

42

The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy

Vol. 31:1

Other courts use non-statutory methods to regulate ex parte defense
interviews, such as common-law or general discovery principles. 38 In these
states, such non-statutory regulation is often poorly defined. 39 For instance,
the Washington Supreme Court held that defense counsel ex parte interviews
with treating physicians in personal injury cases are prohibited. 40 However,
a recent decision held that there is an exception where the treating physician
is employed by the defendant. 41 In Youngs v. PeaceHealth, the Supreme
Court of Washington examined the intersection of the corporate attorneyclient privilege and the state’s long established ban on ex parte defense
interviews. 42 In consolidated appeals of two cases involving claims against
a corporate health provider based on alleged medical malpractice of its
employed physicians, the court held that defense counsel for the institution
could conduct ex parte interviews of physician employees whose treatment
of the plaintiff patient had been placed into issue, or who otherwise has
direct knowledge of the treatment at issue in the litigation. 43 However, the
court limited the scope of such ex parte interviews to the “facts of the
alleged negligent incident.” 44 The court explained: “[w]e emphasize that
‘the facts of the alleged negligent incident’ do not encompass health care
that was provided before or after the event triggering the litigation, such as
care for preexisting conditions or post-event recovery. This is true even
where such care bears on the issue of damages.” 45 The dynamic state of the
common law in Washington on this one aspect of ex parte contacts with
treating physicians illustrates some of the uncertainty a common law
approach creates.

lawsuit—and it has been subject to litigation regarding whether it was meant to reach
non-written disclosures. See infra Section III.
38. See, e.g., Benally v. United States, 216 F.R.D. 478, 480-81 (D. Ariz. 2003)
(applying discovery principles); Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D. 85, 91 (D.S.C. 1991)
(applying discovery principles); Kraemer v. Patterson, 29 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Ark. 2000)
(applying common law displacement principles to hold other statutes restrict interviews);
Lemieux v. Tandem Health Care of Fla., Inc., 862 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (court order allowing ex parte communication violated statutory physician-patient
privilege); Ruperd v. Ryan, 683 N.E.2d 166, 172 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (noting that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the defendant had violated the Petrillo
doctrine by engaging in ex parte communication which violated the physician-patient
privilege); Petrillo v. Syntex Labs. Inc., 499 N.E. 2d 952, 962-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(applying general discovery principles to regulate).
39. Parsons, supra note 23, at 273.
40. Loudon v. Mhyre, 756 P.2d 138, 140 (Wash. 1988).
41. Youngs v. PeaceHealth, 316 P.3d 1035, 1039 (Wash. 2014).
42. Id. at 1038.
43. Id. at 1039-40, 1045.
44. Id. at 1048.
45. Id.
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Other states have ignored the issue leaving all parties involved without
guidance about what is permitted in these ex parte communications. 46
Regardless of the approach a state or federal court chooses, it is clear that the
state of law is fragmented. 47 An analysis of the underlying law and policy
issues is critical in developing an informed, balanced approach to the
regulation of ex parte treating physician interviews.

B. PATIENT PRIVILEGE, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND HIPAA: NOT AUTOMATIC
BARS TO EX PARTE DEFENSE INTERVIEWS
1. The Patient Privilege’s Interplay with Ex Parte Interviews
Patient privileges impact the ex parte treating physician issue because, at
bottom, defense counsel are generally not permitted to gather information
which is privileged. 48 Because states vary widely in structuring and
applying the patient privilege, it is difficult to determine whether, when, and
to what extent defense counsel may interview treating physicians. 49 Courts
focused on protecting patient privilege sometimes feel compelled to disallow
the practice altogether. 50
Although the patient-physician privilege did not exist in English common
law, 51 all states today afford their citizens with some sort of privilege that
prevents others from accessing or disclosing the private information shared
between a patient and physician. 52 New York became the first state to
46. Nevada is an example, with no explicit statutory language either permitting or
banning the practice, and no common law addressing all aspects of the issue as binding
precedent. Leavitt v. Siems, 330 P.3d 1, 7 (Nev. 2014).
47. See Smith, supra note 24, at 255-56.
48. See Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and
Professional Secret, 39 SW. L. J. 661, 680-81 (1985) (discussing the prohibition on
collecting privileged information).
49. See generally Smith, supra note 24.
50. See, e.g., Loudon v. Mhyre, 756 P.2d 138, 140-42 (Wash. 1988).
51. See Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tenn. 1965) (citation omitted);
Shuman, supra note 48, at 674-76 (noting that the United Kingdom does not recognize
the physician-patient privilege and many of its commonwealths have followed suit);
Jennings, supra note 5, at 445 n.39.
52. Including the District of Columbia, all but six states have a physician-patient
privilege statute. 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES app. D (2d ed. 2010) (noting that Alabama,
Maryland, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia do not
recognize the privilege); Jennings, supra note 5, at 447-48 n.471. Some scholars have
argued that the physician-patient privilege is an anachronism because society’s reliance
on medical treatment outweighs patient’s confidentiality concerns. See Cynthia Ford,
Doctor, Doctor, Mr. M.D.: Dr./Patient privilege in MT, MONT. LAW., at 22 (Sept. 2014)
(quoting Callahan v. Burton, 487 P.2d 515, 518-20 (Mont. 1971) (“The physician- patient
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institute a patient-privilege statute in 1828. 53 New York’s legislature noted
two driving purposes behind the new privilege. First, that protecting
confidentiality between doctor and patient would promote public health by
encouraging candor. 54 Second, the legislature analogized to the attorneyclient privilege, reasoning that a patient has just as much of an expectation
of confidentiality as does an attorney’s client. 55
Generally, the patient-privilege is evidentiary and applies only to
testimony. 56 Moreover, almost uniformly, the privilege can only be invoked
by the patient—not the physician, unless the physician is wielding the

privilege is an anachronism which has come under considerable criticism.”); Zechariah
Chafee Jr., Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the
Doctor’s Mouth on the Witness Stand, 52 YALE L. J. 607, 609 (1943) (stating that except
for a few highly disgraceful illnesses, “medical treatment is so valuable that few would
lose it to prevent facts from coming to light in court.”).
53. Robert A. Wade, The Ohio Physician-Patient Privilege: Modified, Revised, and
Defined, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1146, 1147 (1989) (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. 406 § 73 (1828));
Jennings, supra note 5, at 445 n.40 (“No person duly authorized to practice physic or
surgery, shall be compelled to disclose any information which he may have acquired in
attending any patient, in a professional character, and which information was necessary to
enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him, as a
surgeon.”) (quoting N.Y. REV. STAT. 1829 II, 406, part III, tit. 3, ch. VII, art. VIII, § 7).
54. Jennings, supra note 5, at 445 n.41 (citation omitted); see Kenneth S. Broun, Et
Al., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 105 (7th Ed. 2013).
55. Jennings, supra note 5, at 445-46; see Broun, supra note 54.
56. Jennings, supra note 5, at 448 (“[p]rivilege statutes are generally evidentiary in
nature and usually govern only testimony . . . .”). The physician-patient privilege limits
“judicial truth-seeking.” Raymond F. Miller, Creating Evidentiary Privileges: An
Argument for the Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV. 771, 783 (1999). Protection of
privileged communication is the purpose of testimonial privileges. See James H.
Feldman & Carolyn Sievers Reed, Silences in the Storm: Testimonial Privileges in
Matrimonial Disputes, 21 FAM. L.Q. 189, 192 (1987). While most courts today treat the
patient-privilege as a purely evidentiary shield to prevent privileged testimony, there are
a variety of cases 1) distinguishing between an evidentiary privilege and extra judicial
confidentiality borne out of a fiduciary duty, 2) lumping both protections together, and 3)
not recognizing a privilege for testimony. See Jennings, supra note 5, at 444, 448 n.49,
455 n.77, 459, 469, 477. The patient-confidentiality doctrine, not to be confused with the
patient privilege, is not analyzed in this Note because it has so rarely been brought into
the ex parte analysis, but there are some courts which find a patient-confidentiality duty
to be the central factor in ex parte interview cases. Id. at 448, n.49; Manion v. N.P.W.
Med. Ctr. of N.E. Pa., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 593 (M.D. Pa.1987) (“The prohibition
against unauthorized ex parte contacts between defense counsel and a plaintiff’s treating
physician is, moreover, completely separate and distinct from the statutory physicianpatient privilege . . . .”). But cf. Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30, 34 n.8 (Mich.1991)
(stating that any patient-confidentiality duty was “subsumed by the physician-patient
privilege”).
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privilege on behalf of the patient. 57 Finally, every state qualifies the patientprivilege either with common law waiver doctrines 58 or privilege-exception
statutes, 59 which require waiver of the patient-privilege in certain
circumstances.
In most jurisdictions, a plaintiff affects some sort of waiver of the patientprivilege by voluntarily disclosing privileged information. 60 However, this
waiver may or may not be triggered by the institution of a lawsuit—leaving
defense counsel uncertain when a waiver is in effect absent a specific court
ruling. 61 Even if a waiver is triggered, this does not end the privilege
quandary. There are then questions regarding the scope of subject matter
waived and whether it extends to informal discovery such as ex parte
interviews. 62 A court may also require the plaintiff to affirmatively waive
his or her privilege in order to bring suit. 63
57. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.235 (2012) (“ 1. The privilege may be claimed by
the patient, by the patient’s guardian or conservator, or by the personal representative of a
deceased patient. 2. The person who was the doctor may claim the privilege but only on
behalf of the patient. The person’s authority so to do is presumed in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.”); Sarphie v. Rowe, 618 So.2d 905, 908 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
(noting that the privilege is held by the patient); Jennings, supra note 5, at 448-49 n.50.
58. See David L. Woodard, Shielding the Plaintiff and Physician: The Prohibition of
Ex Parte Contacts with a Plaintiff’s Treating Physician, 13 CAMPBELL L. REV. 233, 23839 (1991).
59. Jennings, supra note 5, at 449 n.51 (discussing how states statutorily allow for
waiver of the physician-patient privilege); Shuman, supra note 49, at 678 (stating that
different jurisdictions have statutorily imposed an exception to the physician-patient
privilege). For examples of statutory waivers of the physician-patient privilege, see e.g.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-12-1 (2013); HAW. R. EVID. § 504-1. For case law waiving the
physician-patient privilege, see Jordan v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 891,
899-00 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Loudon v. Mhyre, 756 P.2d 138, 140 (Wash. 1988) (cited
in Jennings, supra note 5, at 449 n.51).
60. Shuman, supra note 49, at 685; see, e.g., Loudon, 756 P.2d at 140 (“A patient
may waive this privilege by putting his or her physical condition in issue.”); Smith v.
Am. Home Prods. Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharm., 855 A.2d 608, 623 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 2003) (stating that when a patient files a personal injury suit there is a waiver of the
physician-patient privilege).
61. Jennings, supra note 5, at 461.
62. Id. at 461-62; see, e.g., Weiss v. Astellas Pharma, US, Inc., No. CIVA 05-527JMH, 2007 WL 2137782, *5 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (allowing treating physicians to participate
in ex parte conferences with counsel for the patient’s adversary in litigation because of
waiver); Holzle v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 110376, 2005 WL 1252597, at *7-8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 2005) (applying the waiver defense to allow a personal injury
plaintiff’s treating physicians to participate in ex parte conferences with defense counsel).
63. See Filz v. Mayo Found., 136 F.R.D. 165, 175 (D. Minn. 1991) (applying federal
procedural law to compel the plaintiff to authorize ex parte interviews); see also Doe v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not prohibit ex parte interviews with treating physicians once patient
waives the privilege by filing a lawsuit).
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As a practical matter in most states and cases, defense counsel will have
the ability to access the information held by a treating physician because the
plaintiff filed a lawsuit and thus waived privilege, at least partially. 64
Therefore, as long as defense counsel does not seek information related to
medical conditions outside the scope of the current litigation, the patient
privilege should not act as an automatic bar to ex parte defense interviews. 65
The patient privilege does not appear to constitute an automatic bar to ex
parte defense counsel interviews. 66 However, that is not to say that the
privilege should not be considered when courts or legislatures regulate
interviews. The concerns raised by courts, such as those in Arizona, should

64. See Jennings, supra note 5, at 474; see, e.g., Morgan v. Cnty. of Cook, 625
N.E.2d 136, 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
65. See Brandt v. Med. Def. Assocs., 856 S.W.2d 667, 674-75 (Mo. 1993) (stating
that a physician cannot disclose confidential information outside of what is at issue in the
lawsuit); Jennings, supra note 5, at 470. It should be noted that a small number of courts
prohibit ex parte interviews because of a perceived risk that the physician will disclose
more information than the privilege-waiver reaches. See Jacqueline M. Asher, Ex Parte
Interviews With Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians-The Offensive Use Of The PhysicianPatient Privilege, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 501, 513 (1990) (quoting Karsten v. McCray, 509
N.E.2d 1376, 1384 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987)) (“Discussion of the patient’s confidences under
circumstances other than through formal discovery is potentially harmful to the interests
of the patient in that the physician might disclose intimate facts regarding the patient
which are unrelated and irrelevant to the mental or physical condition placed at issue in
the lawsuit.”). For example, Arizona courts have interpreted the patient privilege as
prohibiting ex parte interviews “as a matter of public policy and as a means to preserve
the integrity of the privilege.” Benally v United States, 216 F.R.D. 478, 480 (D. Ariz.
2003); see also Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Iowa
1986) (“[W]e cannot accept . . . that the plaintiff’s suit totally waives the confidential
nature of the physician-patient relationship. It only waives the application of the
privilege, which is confined by the statute to a testimonial setting, and does not speak to
ex parte communications in a nontestimonial setting.”). However, the source of these
courts’ power to ban defense counsel interviews based solely on a theoretical risk that a
physician may disclose information is unclear. But see Benally, 216 F.R.D. at 480-81
(presenting public policy considerations as supporting the prohibition of defense counsel
ex parte interview with treating physician). Moreover, these courts do not appear to be
holding that the patient-privilege prohibits the interviews—the courts are simply
choosing to exert their discretionary power to regulate informal discovery based on a
perceived policy risk. See id. It should also be noted that the authors could locate no
empirical study investigating the extent to which physicians have revealed privileged
information to defense counsel.
66. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 890 F. Supp. 2d 896,
902 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (noting that “state law banning ex parte communications between
defense counsel and a plaintiff’s treating physician merely governs the method of
discovery, not the operation of the privilege”); Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr. of N.E. Pa.,
Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 590, 594-95 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (discussing the extent of physicianpatient privilege and recognizing that the physician-patient relationship did not serve as
an absolute bar to ex parte interviews).
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be addressed within a framework that balances the competing policy
interests. Thus, uncertainty about the scope of the privilege requires clear
rules regarding what defense counsel is permitted to discuss with treating
physicians.
2. HIPAA, Patient Confidentiality, and Ex Parte Defense Interviews of
Treating Physicians
HIPAA has fed uncertainty about the permissibility of ex parte treating
physician interviews prompting some courts to outright ban the practice. 67
HIPAA addresses the extent to which a “covered entity,” practically
speaking a health care professional or health care institution, may disclose a
patient’s Protected Health Information (PHI). 68
HIPAA created a detailed scheme permitting patient information
disclosure in a wide variety of circumstances including during an ongoing
lawsuit. 69 Specifically, HIPAA permits disclosure of PHI “in the course of
any judicial or administrative proceeding” either “[i]n response to an order
of a court or administrative tribunal” or “[i]n response to a subpoena,
discovery request, or other lawful process.” 70 For the latter method, HIPAA
requires the provider receive assurance that “reasonable efforts have been
made … to ensure that the individual who is the subject of the protected
health information that has been requested has been given notice of the
request; or … that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to secure
a qualified protective order.” 71 As a result, HIPAA’s plain language permits

67. See, e.g., Weiss v. Astellas Pharma, US, Inc., No. CIVA 05-527 JMH, 2007 WL
2137782, *5 (E.D. Ky. July 23, 2007) (allowing ex parte interviews only if plaintiff’s
physician agrees to be interviewed); Moreland v. Austin, 670 S.E.2d 68, 72 (Ga. 2008)
(holding that HIPAA prohibits ex parte defense interviews without a court order); see
also Beverly Cohen, Reconciling the HIPAA Privacy Rule with State Laws Regulating Ex
Parte Interviews of Plaintiffs’ Treating Physicians: A Guide to Performing HIPAA
Preemption Analysis, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1091, 1092-94 (2006) (discussing state laws
governing discovery in ex parte interviews and the confusion caused by varying
interpretations of HIPAA’s privacy accommodations); Angela T. Burnette & D’Andrea J.
Morning, HIPAA and Ex Parte Interviews—The Beginning of the End?, 1 J. HEALTH &
LIFE SCI. L. 73, 81-85 (2008) (analyzing HIPAA’s effect ex parte interviews).
68. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103, 164.512 (2013); see, e.g., H.R. Rep. No.
104-736, (1996).
69. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(i)-(ii).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(iii)-(iv). The seeking party must establish that:
(A) The party requesting such information has made a good faith attempt to
provide written notice to the individual (or, if the individual’s location is
unknown, to mail a notice to the individual’s last known address);
(B) The notice included sufficient information about the litigation or
proceeding in which the protected health information is requested to permit
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disclosure of a patient’s medical information by any “lawful process” once a
lawsuit is ongoing in litigation. 72 Moreover, neither the Act, nor its
legislative history, expressly prohibits defense counsel ex parte interviews. 73
The language of the statute appears to have no effect on ex parte defense
counsel interviews—if the jurisdiction allows the process then HIPAA does
not interfere. 74
Shortly after HIPAA’s enactment, many commentators predicted that
HIPAA signaled the death knell for defense counsel ex parte interviews with
treating physicians. 75 Yet, this has generally not been the case. 76 Many

the individual to raise an objection to the court or administrative tribunal;
and
(C) The time for the individual to raise objections to the court or
administrative tribunal has elapsed, and:
(1) No objections were filed; or
(2) All objections filed by the individual have been resolved by the
court or the administrative tribunal and the disclosures being sought
are consistent with such resolution.
(iv) For the purposes of paragraph (e)(1)(ii)(B) of this section, a covered entity
receives satisfactory assurances from a party seeking protected health
information, if the covered entity receives from such party a written statement
and accompanying documentation demonstrating that:
(A) The parties to the dispute giving rise to the request for information
have agreed to a qualified protective order and have presented it to the
court or administrative tribunal with jurisdiction over the dispute; or
(B) The party seeking the protected health information has requested a
qualified protective order from such court or administrative tribunal.
Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(iii)-(iv).
72. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii).
73. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2014).
74. See Reading & Strong, supra note 12, at 31 (stating that “HIPAA does not bar
the disclosure of protected health information, [but instead] the statute and regulations
establish procedural requirements that someone must meet before obtaining protected
health information”).
75. See Burnette & Morning, supra note 67, at 82; see, e.g., Law v. Zuckerman, 307
F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Md. 2004) (decided shortly after HIPAA was enacted, and
stating that the “statute has radically changed the landscape of how litigators can conduct
informal discovery in cases involving medical treatment”).
76. See Reading & Strong, supra note 12, at 31 (“It appears that HIPAA is not the
weapon that plaintiffs’ attorneys try to make it out to be.”). HIPAA’s ineffectiveness is
certainly true in states that prohibit the ex parte contacts because the state laws are thus
more restrictive than HIPAA and not preempted. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No.
04 C 55, 2004 WL 292079, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2004). Some jurisdictions that prohibited ex
parte defense interviews with the treating physician now permit them under HIPAA.
Compare Valentino v. Gaylord Hosp., No. CV 90 0266784, 1992 WL 43134, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 1992) (banning ex parte defense interviews with defense
counsel under state law) with Santaniello v. Sweet, No. 3:04CV806 (RNC), 2007 WL
214605, at *3 (D. Conn. 2007) (now allowing the contact after the enactment of HIPAA).
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courts have continued to either allow or prohibit ex parte defense interviews
on some other basis without addressing HIPAA’s applicability. 77 Some
courts accept the argument that HIPAA prohibits ex parte defense
interviews. 78 However, in three jurisdictions that allowed ex parte
communications before HIPAA, courts analyzing the applicability of the
statute in detail each found that ex parte defense interviews were still
permitted. 79 Other courts have entered protective orders before finding that
ex parte defense interviews may proceed. 80 Generally, courts hold that
HIPAA permits defense counsel ex parte contacts in the absence of state or

77. See Reading & Strong, supra note 12, at 31-33. For examples of courts
considering whether to permit defense counsel ex parte contacts, while ignoring HIPAA,
see Benally v. United States, 216 F.R.D. 478, 480 (D. Ariz. 2003); In re Yasmin & Yaz
(Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-MD-02100-DRHPMF, 2011 WL 9996459, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2011); In re Collins, 224 S.W.3d 798,
801 (Tex. App. 2007); Drechsel v. Narby, 873 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409 (App. Div. 2009);
Sorensen v. Barbuto, 177 P.3d 614, 619 (Utah 2008); In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 1:06-40000, 2010 WL 320064, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 20, 2010).
78. There are some examples of courts finding that HIPAA implicitly prohibits ex
parte defense counsel interviews with treating physicians. See, e.g., Piehl v. Saheta, No.
CCB-13-254, 2013 WL 2470128, at *2 (D. Md. June 5, 2013) (quoting 45 C.F.R. §
165.512(e)(1)(i) (2012)) (finding that HIPAA prohibits ex parte defense counsel
interviews with treating physicians, in part, because HIPAA allows only “‘expressly
authorized,’ limited, and specifically identified protected health information” which
would likely be violated in an ex parte interview; and because Congress created a
heightened privacy interest in medical information).
79. Kentucky, New Jersey and Texas have determined that HIPAA does not preempt
and state law. See, e.g., In re Diet Drug Litigation, 895 A.2d 493, 501-02 (N.J. Super. Ct.
2005) (“HIPAA and . . . ex parte interview[s] can co-exist”); In re Collins, 286 S.W.3d
911, 920 (Tex. 2009) (holding that authorized disclosure as permitted by a state law is not
preempted by HIPAA). This perspective is bolstered by the fact that HIPAA explicitly
leaves state privilege law untouched. Reading & Strong, supra note 12, at 31; Standards
for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82462, 82596
(Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164) (stating that Federal Rules of
Evidence and states’ rules of evidence dealing with privileges were meant to remain
untouched by HIPAA).
80. Reading & Strong, supra note 12, at 33; see, e.g., Nicholas v. City of
Binghamton, No. 3:10-CV-1565, 2013 WL 773328, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) (“By
commencing this litigation and claiming personal injuries, Plaintiff has put her medical
condition at issue. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to explore her medical condition
as part of their defense . . . the Court finds that, provided an appropriate protective order
is put in place (which Defendants shall supply to the Magistrate Judge for approval),
Defendants may speak with Plaintiff’s treating physicians on an ex parte basis.”);
Holman v. Rasak, 761 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (allowing interviews
“‘[i]f a qualified protective order, consistent with [Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations] was in place then an ex parte discussion with
the [treating physician] would be appropriate’”) (citation omitted); Wade v. VabnickWener, 922 F. Supp. 2d 679, 690 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).
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federal law to the contrary. 81 However, some courts state that HIPAA has
created further privacy protections, inferring that Congress intended to
prohibit ex parte treating physician interviews. 82 Clients and attorneys are
often uncertain about HIPAA’s import because of the lack of precedent on
point. 83
That HIPAA has induced further uncertainty for courts, attorneys, and
clients concerning when ex parte interviews are permitted further
demonstrates the need for a standardized approach. As we have seen, the
statute’s plain language, as recognized by courts considering the matter,
does not support the notion that HIPAA creates an automatic bar to ex parte
defense interviews. 84

81. The clear majority considering the question has found that HIPAA alone does not
prevent ex parte defense counsel contact with treating physicians. Reading & Strong,
supra note 12, at 33; see, e.g., Santaniello v. Sweet, No. 3:04CV806 (RNC), 2007 WL
214605, at *3 (D. Conn. 2007) (ex parte communication with hospitals’ employees
permitted under HIPAA as disclosure of medical records during judicial proceeding);
Lowen v. Van Christi Hosps. Wichita, Inc., No. 10-1201-RDR, 2010 WL 4739431, *3
(D. Kan. 2010) (allowed for ex parte communication after obtaining a protective order);
Lee v. Sup. Ct., 177 Cal. App. 4th 1108, 1135-36 (2009) (California statute allowing to a
district attorney to obtain certain confidential health information which complied with
HIPAA); Reutter v. Weber, 179 P.3d 977, 983-84 (Colo. 2007) (ex parte communication
permitted under the exception to the physician-patient privilege under Colorado law);
Baker v. Wellstar Health Sys., 703 S.E.2d 601, 604 (Ga. 2010) (holding that protective
order obtained by hospital allowed for ex parte communication under HIPAA, but that
under Georgia law was too broad); Holman v. Rasak, 761 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2008), aff’d 785 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Mich. 2010) (HIPAA does not preempt Michigan
law that permits defense counsel to engage in ex parte communication with plaintiff’s
treating physician provided there is a protective order in place); Robeck v. Lunas Constr.
Clean-Up, Inc., No. 53576, 2011 WL 2139941, at *1 (Nev. May 27, 2011) (ex parte
communication with the treating physician does not contravene HIPAA); In re Diet Drug
Litigation, 895 A.2d 493, 501-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005) (stating that HIPAA and ex parte
communications can coexist); Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharma.,
855 A.2d 608, 621-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2003) (holding that ex parte treating physician
interviews, like other informal discovery mechanisms in general, are not addressed by
HIPAA, and thus such interviews are in no way preempted by the statute); Arons v.
Jutkowitz, 880 N.E.2d 831, 842 (N.Y. 2007) (HIPAA privacy rules does not prevent
informal discovery through ex parte communication under New York law); Holmes v.
Nightingale, 158 P.3d 1039, 1043 (Okla. 2007) (protective order allowing ex parte
communication with health care providers does not contravene HIPAA); Law v.
Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 713 (D. Md. 2004); Wade, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
82. See, e.g., Moreland v. Austin, 670 S.E.2d 68, 70 (Ga. 2008); see generally
Cohen, supra note 67.
83. Parsons, supra note 23, at 273.
84. Am. Home Products Corp., 855 A.2d at 623-24 (holding that ex parte treating
physician interviews, like other informal discovery mechanisms in general, are not
addressed by HIPAA, and thus such interviews are in no way preempted by the statute).
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C. The Policy Interests Raised by Both Sides of the Bar
Not surprisingly, the absence of clear guidance in the various statutes and
federal and state cases about whether ex parte defense interviews should be
permitted has fueled an ongoing spirited debate among interested parties and
commentators. 85 This article examines persuasive arguments raised by both
sides of the bar with the hope that legislatures and courts will balance these
concerns in regulating ex parte interviews.
1. Plaintiffs’ Position: Defense Counsel Cannot be Trusted to Behave While
in Private Interviews with Treating Physicians
Courts prohibiting ex parte defense interviews cite various supporting
rationales. 86 First, the federal, or a given state’s, rules of civil procedure, do
not expressly permit ex parte defense interviews. 87 Some courts suggest that
the “official” discovery options open to defense counsel are sufficient to
gather relevant medical information and that depositions should be the
“exclusive” path to substantive communication with a treating physician. 88
Some courts expressing this view emphasize the sanctioning and supervisory
powers available to the court during the course of formal discovery which
85.
86.
87.

See Jennings, supra note 5, at 454-59.
See id. at 456-58.
See King v. Ahrens, 798 F. Supp. 1371, 1373 (W.D. Ark. 1992), aff’d 16 F.3d
265 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that cases prohibiting ex parte communication point to the
rules that authorize deposition of treating physicians and thus only permit formal
discovery); Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443, 445 (D.N.D. 1981) (stating that the federal
rules of civil procedure allow for several methods “by which discovery of examining
physicians may be obtained”); Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353,
356 (Iowa 1986) (“Our rule speaks only to depositions, interrogatories, production of
documents, inspection, physical and mental examination, and requests for admissions . . .
The addition of a new discovery method, the court enforced waiver of privilege leading
to ex parte informal interviews with physicians, should be accomplished by a change in
the Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than by judicial fiat.”); State ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan,
776 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Mo. 1989) (noting that Missouri rules do not expressly forbid ex
parte communication, but also do not expressly authorize communication); Jaap v. Dist.
Ct. of the Eighth Jud. Dist., 623 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Mont. 1981) (holding that methods of
discovery not permitted by the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be enforced by
the court); Stoller v. Moo Young Jun, 499 N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(holding that defendants are not entitled to conduct unauthorized private interviews with
nonparty treating physicians); Anker v. Brodnitz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1979) (“[T]he better rule denies defendant the right to question plaintiff’s doctors outside
formal discovery procedures.”); State ex rel. Klieger v. Alby, 373 N.W.2d 57, 60-61
(Wis. App. 1985) (stating that the definition of discovery under Wisconsin law does not
include ex parte conferences).
88. See, e.g., Garner v. Ford Motor Co., 61 F.R.D. 22, 23-24 (D. Alaska 1973); King,
798 F. Supp. at 1373; Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443, 445 (D.N.D. 1981); Roberson v.
Liu, 555 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d
952, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
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would be unavailable in informal ex parte interviews 89 and lead to an
unwelcome loss of judicial control.
Judicial decisions barring ex parte defense interviews rely on other
policies. Some courts observe that allowing a defendant unfettered access to
treating physicians may discourage patients from openly discussing their
health concerns, which is a rationale similar to that underlying the patient
privilege. 90 Other courts hold that physicians have a fiduciary-type duty that
is not waived merely because their patients filed lawsuits. 91 Similarly,
courts interpret their state patient-privilege statutes as implicitly banning ex
parte defense counsel interviews. 92 Some courts hold that the contact will

89. State ex rel. Proctor v. Messina, 320 S.W. 2d 146, 156 (Mo. 2010) (en banc);
Horner v. Rowan Cos. Inc., 153 F.R.D. 597, 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (“[T]he potential for
breaches in confidentiality can have a chilling effect upon the critically important
underlying relationship.”); Roberson, 555 N.E.2d at 1002; Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 959.
90. “[C]ourts in New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington have held that
public policy, separate and apart from a patient privilege, prohibits defense counsel from
engaging in ex parte interviews with treating physicians.” Reading & Strong, supra note
12, at 32; Smith v. Ashby, 743 P.2d 114, 115 (N.M. 1987) (quoting Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d
at 957) (stating that ex parte communication may threaten the “sanctity” of the physicianpatient relationship); Crist v. Moffatt, 389 S.E.2d 41, 46-47 (N.C. 1990) (noting that
patient’s expectation that physicians will comply with the Hippocratic oath outweigh the
practical advantages of ex parte interviews and physicians may expose themselves to
professional misconduct by breaching the oath); Loudon v. Mhyre, 756 P.2d 138, 141
(Wash. 1988) (stating that it is difficult to imagine that a physician would engage in ex
parte communication without endangering the truth and faith that patients invest in
physicians). Some cases hold that doctors have a duty of confidentiality. See Horne v.
Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 830 (Ala. 1973) (“[T]he preservation of the patient’s privacy is
no mere ethical duty upon the part of the doctor; there is a legal duty as well.”) (citation
omitted); Smith, 743 P.2d at 115; Crist, 389 S.E.2d at 46; Loudon, 756 P.2d at 141.
91. First Interstate Bank of Oregon v. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Norwich, 127
F.R.D. 186, 188 (D. Or. 1989) (noting that the privilege is not waived under Oregon state
law until a party offers up the physician as a witness who testifies to the condition). One
court stated that treating physicians have an affirmative duty to never help defense
counsel unless ordered to do so by the court. Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142, 146
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1962); see Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr. of N.E. Pa., Inc., 676 F. Supp.
585, 594 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (“Physicians owe a fiduciary duty to their patients not to
disclose their patients’ confidences. . . .”).
92. See, e.g., Smith v. Orthopedics Int’l, Ltd., P.S., 244 P.3d 939, 948-949 (Wash.
2010); Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 956-57. Some states have interpreted the privilege to
prohibit ex parte interviews by defendant’s counsel of plaintiff’s treating physicians, as a
means to preserve the integrity of the privilege. See Duquette v. Sup. Ct., 778 P.2d 634,
640 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
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unfairly defeat the public’s expectation of confidentiality 93 while yielding no
significant gain. 94
Another policy concern for courts is the physicians’ lack of legal
training. 95 Courts justify this concern by reasoning that in this unsupervised
and informal setting doctors are likely to inadvertently disclose prejudicial or
privileged information that is outside of the boundaries of the given
litigation. 96
Then there is the unscrupulous defense attorney that might, in this
unmediated forum, use some nefarious tactic to unfairly coerce a treating
physician, 97 such as invoking the threat of increased malpractice insurance
rates. 98 Still, other courts have barred ex parte interviews because it would
unfairly expose doctors to either tort liability for breach of the patient’s right
to privacy, or professional discipline for unprofessional conduct. 99

93. See, e.g., Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 957 (stating that society possess an established
and beneficial interest in the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship).
94. See, e.g., Karsten v. McCray, 509 N.E.2d 1376, 1384 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (stating
that a party can obtain the same information through formal discovery as can be obtained
through informal methods which supports the use of discovery to protect a privileged
communication); Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 956 (stating that formal discovery reveals the
same information that informal methods reveals); Anker v. Brodnitz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582,
583 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1979) (noting that the defendant did not demonstrate that formal
discovery procedures were inadequate to uncover the specific information sought by ex
parte communication).
95. See, e.g., Duquette, 778 P.2d at 641 (“A physician may lack an understanding of
the legal distinction between an informal method of discovery such as an ex parte
interview, and formal methods of discovery such as depositions and interrogaties, and
may therefore feel compelled to participate in the ex parte interview.”); Manion, 676 F.
Supp. at 594-95.
96. See, e.g., Duquette, 778 P.2d at 641; Manion, 676 F. Supp. at 595 (discussing
concerns about defense counsel practices in medical malpractice context of ex parte
defense interviews); In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 890 F.
Supp. 2d 896, 906-07 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citation omitted) (discussing policies behind ban
on ex parte contacts with treating physicians, and stating that such contacts are thought to
be “potentially harmful to the interests of the patient in that the physician might disclose
intimate facts of the patient which are unrelated and irrelevant to the mental or physical
condition placed at issue in the lawsuit”).
97. See Anker, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 585 (stating that physicians may be wrongfully
pressured into revealing privileged information); Manion, 676 F. Supp. at 595; Horner v.
Rowan Cos., 153 F.R.D. 597, 600 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
98. See Manion, 676 F. Supp. at 591.
99. Courts have also banned contact to reduce the number of lawsuits physicians face
for breaching patient privilege. See, e.g., Anker, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 585; Horner, 153
F.R.D. at 600-01.
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2. Defendants’ Position: Ex Parte Defense Interviews Simply Level the
Playing Field
Some courts, when permitting ex parte defense interviews, reason that
allowing defendant’s counsel to contact treating physicians is more
equitable to the parties, 100 and may be beneficial. 101 Some courts see
treating physicians as important fact witnesses (albeit fact witnesses with
special expertise) with no loyalties after suit has been filed and the patientprivilege waived. 102 These courts often reason that “no party to litigation
has anything resembling a proprietary right to any witness’s evidence.
Absent a privilege, no party is entitled to restrict an opponent’s access to a
witness . . . by insisting upon some notion of allegiance.”103 Doe v. Eli
Lilly & Co championed this perspective:
Even an expert whose knowledge has been purchased cannot be
silenced by the party who is paying him on that ground alone.
Unless impeded by privilege an adversary may inquire, in advance
of trial, by any lawful manner, to learn what any witness knows if
other appropriate conditions the witness alone may impose are
satisfied, [such as] compensation for his time and expertise or
payment of reasonable expenses involved. 104
A defendant’s counsel is no more likely than a plaintiff’s counsel to
misuse contact with a treating physician and there are many sound policy
reasons supporting these interviews. 105 For but one example, the Federal

100. See Weiss v. Astellas Pharma, US, Inc., No. CIVA 05-527 JMH, 2007 WL
2137782, at *4-5 (E.D. Ky. July 23, 2007); Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14,
19 (D. Mass. 1989) (stating that “the function of interviewing witnesses without the
presence of opposing counsel in order to gain information” is an “important function[]
which counsel traditionally play[s] in litigation . . .”).
101. Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 206, 208 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (“We
encourage counsel for the parties to arrange informal conferences with the physicians in
lieu of depositions when possible to reduce expenses in this case, and we likewise
encourage counsel to offer to opposing counsel the opportunity to be present when
informal communications take place.”).
102. For cases holding that physicians are to be treated like all other fact witnesses:
see, e.g., Thomas v. Four Season Nursing Ctr. Inc., 206 F.R.D. 294, 296 (N.D. Okla.
2002) (“In the absence of any physician-patient privilege, a party may conduct ex parte
interviews with any doctor just as one could do with any other fact witness.”); In re
Pelvic Mesh/Gynecare Litig., 43 A.3d 1211, 1230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). The
American Medical Association’s ethical rules do not even prohibit the practice. Michael
S. Goldrich, Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs: Medical Testimony,
CEJA Report 12-A-04, AM. MED. ASSOC. 4 (2004).
103. Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co. Inc., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983).
104. Id.
105. Id. (“The potential for influencing trial testimony is inherent in every contact
between a prospective witness and an interlocutor, formal or informal, and what a litigant
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Rules of Civil Procedure are to be “construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.” 106 In furtherance of this policy, federal courts commonly
encourage parties to utilize informal and alternative means of discovery,
including witness interviews. 107 Some commentators attack the argument
that ex parte physician interviews should be prohibited because they are not
expressly permitted by the rules as being counterintuitive,
counterproductive, and contrary to the spirit of the rules. 108 In short, these
courts recognize that “to disallow a viable, efficient, cost effective method of
ascertaining the truth because of the mere possibility of abuse, smacks too
much of throwing out the baby with the bath water.” 109
Some commentators believe that allowing interviews might encourage
open communication and actually increase the likelihood that all relevant
information is disclosed. 110 One commentator summed this up stating: “[b]y
allowing a free exchange of communication between a treating physician
and a defense attorney, a court actually opens a line of communication, thus
allowing for full and fair disclosure of pertinent facts.” 111
Courts favoring ex parte defense interviews point out the inequality
caused by allowing the plaintiff unfettered access to important witnesses at
any time, while the defendant is allowed a single, monitored, adversarial
session of questioning. 112 One court summed up this view:
may justifiably fear is an attempt by an adversary at improper influence for which there
are sanctions enough if it occurs.”).
106. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
107. See, e.g., Franks v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 234, 237 (W.D. Tex.
1966) (stating that “unless the position of each party is known along with the basis for
taking such position, no intelligent evaluation can be made for settlement purposes” via
formal discovery); see also Trans-World Invs. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Alaska
1976) (“In our opinion . . . informal methods are to be encouraged, for they facilitate
early evaluation and settlement of cases, with a resulting decrease in litigation costs, and
represent further the wise application of judicial resources.”).
108. See Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D. 85, 90-91 (D.S.C. 1991) (stating that the cases
banning ex parte defense counsel interviews with treating physicians based on a lack of
rules permitting the practice are senseless); Trans-World Invs., 554 P.2d at 1152 (“the
intended purpose of our discovery process is to simplify trials, not complicate them . . .
information should be exchanged and requests complied with in a manner demonstrating
candor and common sense.”); Weiss v. Astellas Pharma, US, Inc., No. CIVA 05-527
JMH, 2007 WL 2137782, at *4-5 (E.D. Ky. July 23, 2007).
109. Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371, 1375 n.8 (Alaska 1987).
110. Scott Aripoli, Hungry Hungry HIPAA: Has the Regulation Bitten Off More Than
It Can Chew by Prohibiting Ex Parte Communication with Treating Physicians?, 75
UMKC L. REV. 499, 504 (2006).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985);
Frantz v. Golebiewski, 407 So. 2d 283, 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Covington v.
Sawyer, 458 N.E.2d 465, 470-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
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Although the rules are silent on informal methods of discovery,
prohibition of all ex parte interviews would be inconsistent with
the purpose of providing equal access to relevant evidence and
efficient, cost-effective litigation. The omission of interviews from
[] court rules does not mean that they are prohibited, because the
rules are not meant to be exhaustive . . . Their absence from the
court rules does indicate that they are not mandated and that the
physician cannot be forced to comply, but there is nothing in the
court rules precluding an interview if the physician chooses to
cooperate. 113
3. Some Defense Attorneys Have Even Argued that Refusing to Allow
Defense Counsel Ex Parte Contacts Creates Due Process Concerns 114
Commentators have also noted that refusing to allow defendant’s counsel
private interviews with treating physicians threatens the confidentiality of
counsel’s work-product because the defense is unable to avoid revealing his
or her strategy in a deposition, while the plaintiff is under no similar
constraint. 115
Ex parte communications are also less burdensome on witnesses. 116
Physicians have challenging schedules, and allowing an attorney to conduct
an informal interview makes efficient use of the physician and attorney’s
time. 117 Therefore, commentators suggest that allowing contact only
through depositions is therefore unfair to treating physicians. 118
The two camps in this national debate appear firmly divided with no clear
resolution on the horizon. Some courts believe that defense counsel
interviews with a plaintiff’s treating physician create significant risks that
cannot be alleviated through any procedure or protection and outweigh any
benefit derived from the practice. 119 Other courts find that defense counsel
have the right to contact treating physicians, who are in essence merely fact
witnesses, and furthermore, that the benefits from this informal discovery
technique outweigh any potential harms. 120 What this means is that there is

113.
114.

Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30, 36 (Mich. 1991).
See, e.g., Weiss v. Astellas Pharma, US, Inc., No. CIVA 05-527 JMH, 2007 WL
2137782, at *1 (E.D. Ky. July 23, 2007).
115. Burnette & Morning, supra note 67, at 93; Cohen, supra note 67, at 1121.
116. Aripoli, supra note 110, at 521.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Horner v. Rowan Cos., 153 F.R.D. 597, 600-01 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
(prohibiting contact unless the plaintiff gives express authorization); Manion v. N.P.W.
Med. Ctr. of N.E. Pa., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 589, 594-95 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
120. In some instances, ex parte physician contact is permitted by defense counsel, but
only after certain restrictions or requirements are met, or if the plaintiff approves ex parte
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no clear national majority to join. There are reasonable policy arguments
both supporting and opposing ex parte defense interviews.
D. WHY LEGISLATURES AND COURTS NEED TO REVISIT THE REGULATION
OF EX PARTE DEFENSE INTERVIEWS
There are several compelling reasons courts and legislatures should
address the way ex parte defense counsel interviews are regulated. First,
physicians are placed at a severe disadvantage under the current fractured
scheme. 121 Physicians lack extensive training in rules surrounding patient
privilege and defense counsel interviews, and they are rarely given any statespecific training. 122 As each state, and each individual federal and state
court, may currently apply different rules, it is impossible for physicians to
receive training regarding patient privacy and defense counsel interviews. 123
If courts or legislatures create a uniform scheme that consistently regulates
these interviews, physicians could institute training programs that would
enable practitioners to properly respond to interview requests.
Second, existing approaches to regulating interviews do not always appear
to balance the important policy interests raised by all the parties involved. 124
As explained above, some states allow interviews and some states prohibit
them. Regulations should take a more balanced approach when considering
the important interests on both sides of the debate. Unfortunately, the
narrow approach taken by many legislatures and courts suggests they have
listened to only one side of the policy debate, or they have based their
regulations on existing statutes such as HIPAA or the patient privilege, even
where these laws are silent on the practice. Finally, the laws regulating these
interviews in many jurisdictions are vague and thus create costs for both
plaintiffs and defendants in litigating over whether interviews are permitted.
The lack of bright line regulations is particularly challenging for defense
counsel who are left in the dark as to what the law is.
To illustrate the problems plaguing the current regulatory approach taken
by many states, Nevada is used as a case study. 125 The regulation of ex parte
defense counsel interviews in Nevada exhibits each of the above issues:

communication. See Horner, 153 F.R.D. at 601 (prohibiting “private ex parte interviews
between defense counsel and plaintiff’s treating physician unless, with advance notice
thereof, plaintiff specifically and unconditionally authorizes same”).
121. See Jennings, supra note 5, at 457.
122. Id.; Woodard, supra note 58, at 246.
123. See generally Jennings, supra note 5, at 444-54 (discussing jurisdictional split
and various policy arguments).
124. For the factual background for this analysis, see section IV.b.
125. NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.215-.245 (2014); see Parker v. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc.,
No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-VPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126565, at *9-13 (D. Nev. Aug. 27,
2009).
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doctrines such as the patient privilege are blindly relied upon, policy
interests have not been expressly balanced, and the vague state of the law
leaves physicians and attorneys unsure about whether interviews are
permitted.
1. A Case Study of What is Wrong with Many Current Regulatory Regimes:
the State of Nevada
Nevada’s law on ex parte defense interviews is perhaps the ultimate
illustration of why reform is needed. It is plagued with a lack of binding
precedent in a framework which fails to properly balance policy interests. 126
Like other states, Nevada vests patients with the privilege to prevent the
disclosure of confidential medical information shared between doctor and
patient. 127 Nevada law contains a waiver of this privilege which operates
similarly to waivers in most states. 128 For example, if an individual
voluntarily discloses privileged information to a significant degree, such as
the disclosure which occurs when placing physical or mental condition at
issue in personal injury litigation, the information is no longer privileged. 129
Unlike other states, however, the Nevada statute creates an automatic
exception to the physician-patient privilege for “written medical or hospital
records relevant to an . . . element of a claim or defense,” 130 known as the
privilege-exception statute. 131

126. See generally Parker, No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-UPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12652; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.215-.245 (in Nevada, there are several separate
privilege statues, waiver statues, as well as very relevant amendments to the question of
whether ex parte defense counsel interviews with treating physicians are permitted).
127. “A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing confidential communications among the patient, the patient’s doctor or
persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the
doctor, including members of the patient’s family.” Id. § 49.225.
128. Id. § 49.385(1); see OR. REV. STAT. § 40.280 (2014) (declaring the privilege
waived when a party offers up the physician as a witness in litigation).
129. “A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of a
confidential matter waives the privilege if the person or the person’s predecessor while
holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant
part of the matter.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.385(1).
130. “There is no privilege . . . [a]s to written medical or hospital records relevant to
an issue of the condition of the patient in any proceeding in which the condition is an
element or a claim or defense.” Id. § 49.245. This statute also provides a variety of other
exceptions, such as disclosures made in the course of “hospitaliz[ing] the patient for
mental illness.” Id.
131. Steven J. Klearman, Patient-Doctor Privilege Doesn’t Cover Doctor’s
Testimony, Says Judge, THE LEGAL EXAM’R (Feb. 18, 2009 12:28 PM),
http://reno.legalexaminer.com/wrongful-death/patientdoctor-privilege-doesnt-coverdoctors-testimony-says-judge/.
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An earlier amendment to Nevada’s privilege-exception statute raises
questions about whether the state legislature intended to target ex parte
defense interviews. 132 Before it was amended in 1989, the statute prohibited
all “communications” relevant to a claim or defense. 133 After the amendment,
the statute excludes from the privilege only relevant communications
memorialized in “written . . . records.” 134 There is no relevant legislative
history evincing the legislature’s reasoning behind this change, 135 but the
record contains testimony from a member of the Nevada Trial Lawyers
Association—a plaintiff’s bar organization. 136 This speaker urged the
change in the statute’s language to address the problem of defendants who
attempt to take advantage of the privilege by talking about anything with a
doctor, and the problem of doctors being forced to “unilaterally” waive the
patient physician privilege. 137 In short, the speaker urged the legislature to
prevent defense counsel from conducting ex parte defense interviews. 138
This partisan testimony notwithstanding, the statute’s intended purpose is
unclear. The plain language of the privilege-exception statute, even as
amended, does not bar defense ex parte contact with a plaintiff’s treating
doctor; 139 rather the statute merely provides an additional means of avoiding
the patient-privilege in certain circumstances. 140 The Nevada Supreme
132. NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.245. The single federal district court case which
prohibited ex parte defense counsel contacts in Nevada relied on the 1987 amendment as
the primary basis for its holding even though there is no specific statutory language
banning ex parte defense counsel contact. Parker v. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc., No. 3:06CV-518-ECR-UPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126565, *9-13 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2009).
133. See Nev. Assemb. B. 809, 64th Leg. Sess. (Nev. 1987), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Divison/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHS/1987/ab809,1987.
pdf (the Nevada Senate and House’ preamble discussion and summary, in which the
original text of the statute is preserved).
134. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.245.
135. Nev. Assemb. B. 809, 64th Leg., Sess. (Nev. 1987), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Divison/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHS/1987/ab809,1987.
pdf.
136. Id. The Nevada Trial Lawyers Association (since renamed the Nevada Justice
Association) is an organization of “independent lawyers who represent consumers and
share the common goal of improving the civil justice system.” See Nev. Justice Ass’n,
Our
Mission,
http://www.nevadajustice.org/NV/index.cfm?event=showPage
&pg=mission (last visited Apr. 25, 2012).
The Association commonly sends
representatives to speak at meetings of the Nevada legislature. Id.; see also Nev.
Assemb. B. 809, 64th Leg., Sess. (Nev. 1987), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us
/Divison/Research/Library/LegHistory/ LHS/1987/ab809,1987.pdf.
137. Nev. Assemb. B. 809, 64th Leg. Sess. (Nev. 1987), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Divison/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHS/1987/ab809,1987.
pdf.
138. Id.
139. See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.385.
140. Id.
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Court adheres to the rule that if a statute’s language “is clear on its face, a
court can not go beyond the [language] in determining legislative intent.” 141
It is difficult to see how the statute’s language could be ambiguous as to the
specific question of whether it bans ex parte defense interviews—
considering the statutory language is straightforward and makes no mention
of any such contact. 142 The words the legislative body chose to include in a
statute embody the legislature’s intent. 143
Despite the statute’s clear language and Nevada’s “plain meaning rule,”
the legislature’s amendment of the exception statute’s language cannot
escape notice, and arguments can be made that the amendment was aimed at
ex parte defense interviews. 144 However, given the language of the statute
and the context of the common law, the legislature could have meant only to
ensure that defense counsel received no unregulated authority to conduct
informal interviews. 145 The legislature may have been concerned that in
wording the original exception statute broadly to cover any and all
“communications,” they had actually usurped the courts’ default supervisory
power over informal interviews. 146 Additionally, the legislature could have

141. State v. Lucero, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Nev. 2011) (emphasis added and citation
omitted); see Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of
Clark, 97 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Nev. 2004) (citation omitted) (“‘If the plain meaning of a
statute is clear on its face, then [this court] will not go beyond the language of the statute
to determine its meaning.’”); State v. Catanio, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (Nev. 2004) (“We must
attribute the plain meaning to a statute that is not ambiguous. An ambiguity arises where
the statutory language lends itself to two or more reasonable interpretations. Legislative
intent is the controlling factor in statutory construction.”); Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps.
Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. State ex rel. Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 747 P.2d 878, 879
(Nev. 1987) (“When a statute is clear on its face a court may not go beyond the language
of the statute in determining the legislature’s intent.”).
142. NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.245.
143. See generally Yule Kim, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2-5 (2008), available at http://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (discussing the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory
interpretation).
144. See Assemb. B. 809, 1987 Leg. 64th Sess. (Nev. 1987), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Divison/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHS/1987/ab809,1987.
pdf. (discussing the supposed dangers of ex parte defense interviews).
145. State, Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 43 P.3d 4, 9-10 (Wash.
2002) (discussing the interpretation of legislative intent based on a statute’s language and
the plain meaning of key phrases); see also Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp., 865
A.2d 1163, 1174 n.21 (Conn. 2005) (“[T]he legislature is presumed to be aware of prior
judicial decisions involving common-law rules.”).
146. It is notable that the automatic waiver of all relevant “communications” in
Nevada’s exception statute, pre-amendment, was worded more liberally than many
statutes in other states. Nev. Assemb. B. 809, 64th Leg., Sess., 10 (Nev. 1987), available
at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Divison/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHS/1987/ab809,
1987.pdf (showing the pre-amendment language); see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 622.10(3)(a)(2)
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plausibly meant to ensure that courts would have the power to regulate and
supervise informal discovery procedures on a case-by-case basis. 147 Other
states with similar exception statutes have narrower language than Nevada’s
The current narrowly-worded version of
pre-amendment statute. 148
Nevada’s patient privilege-exception statute is similar to other states’
statutes excepting medical information from privilege—suggesting the
statutory revision may not have been intended to outright ban ex parte
contact, but only to narrow the blanket waiver like other states have. 149
Although Nevada courts consider legislative history, courts also make
decisions based on “reason and public policy” when interpreting legislative
intent. 150 Considering that states have generally moved towards permitting
ex parte defense interviews, reason and public policy suggest that Nevada
would not interpret the exception statute as prohibiting ex parte defense
counsel interviews without the legislature unequivocally articulating such a
ban. 151
In line with general principles of statutory interpretation, Nevada courts
will not refer to the legislative record to interpret the statute if they find the
privilege-exception statute unambiguous. 152 Even if there were no “plain
meaning rule” in Nevada, a court would struggle in determining that the

(2014) (explicitly excepting medical records and other specific materials); FLA. STAT. §
394.4615(2) (2014) (identifying specific situations where medical records may be
disclosed during a lawsuit); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.360 (2014) (explicitly regulating scope of
medical information disclosed during lawsuits); CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(b)(1) (2014)
(explicitly requiring a court or administrative order describing information to be
disclosed).
147. See King v. Ahrens, 798 F. Supp. 1371, 1373 (W.D. Ark. 1992), aff’d 16 F.3d
265 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing court powers to manage discovery process).
148. See supra note 146.
149. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.245 with IOWA CODE § 622.10(3)(a)(2) (2005)
(explicitly excepting medical records).
150. State v. Lucero, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Nev. 2011) (stating that “legislative
history . . . and reason and public policy” are the primary rules of construction for
ambiguous statutes); Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. State ex rel.
Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 747 P.2d 878, 880 (Nev. 1987) (“Pursuant to another rule
of statutory construction, an ambiguous statute can be construed ‘in line with what reason
and public policy would indicate the legislature intended.” (quoting McKay v. Bd. Of
Supervisors, 730 P.2d 438, 442 (Nev. 1986))); see Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. Eighth
Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 97 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Nev. 2004) (“In construing an
ambiguous statute, we must give the statute the interpretation that ‘reason and public
policy would indicate the legislature intended.’” (quoting State, Dep’t Mtr. Vehicles v.
Vezeris, 720 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Nev. 1986))); Robert E. v. Justice Ct. of Reno Twp., Cnty.
of Washoe, 662 P.2d 957, 959 (Nev. 1983) (looking to legislative history, reason, and
public policy to determine legislative intent behind ambiguous statute).
151. Smith, supra note 24, at 248; see also Woodard, supra note 58, at 236.
152. Robert E., 662 P.2d at 959 (citing White v. Warden, 614 P.2d 536, 537 (Nev.
1980)).
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legislature intended by this statute to outright ban ex parte defense counsel
contact. 153 Thus, if courts want to ban ex parte defense interviews outright,
they will most likely have to look beyond the privilege-exception statute. 154
Finally, under Nevada’s limited precedent on patient-physician privilege
waiver, a plaintiff no longer has control over defense counsel’s access to
treating physicians after filing a lawsuit. 155 Plaintiffs do not appear to have
any right to narrow their privilege waiver once there has been a waiver:
The patient cannot use this privilege both as a sword and a shield,
to waive when it inures to her advantage, and wield when it does
not . . . no further injury can be inflicted upon the rights and
interests which the statute was intended to protect, and there is no
further reason for its enforcement . . . [once the patient has
released this information] the patient can never be restored to the
condition which the statute, from motives of public policy, has
sought to protect . . . The object of the statute having been
voluntarily defeated by the party for whose benefit it was enacted,
there can be no reason for its continued enforcement in such
cases. 156
Despite years of controversy, only three Nevada cases touch on the issue:
a non-precedential federal district court opinion, an unpublished decision of
the Supreme Court of Nevada, and a Supreme Court of Nevada published
decision. In 2010, a federal district court reached the issue of ex parte
defense interviews in Parker v. Upsher-Smith, applying Nevada state law in
invalidating ex parte interviews. 157 In 2011, the Supreme Court of Nevada
took on ex parte defense interviews for the first time in Robeck v. Lunas, and
appeared to validate the practice under HIPAA. 158 However, the Nevada
Supreme Court left the decision unpublished which prohibits the decision
from being used as binding precedent. 159 In Leavitt v Siems, the Supreme
Court of Nevada spoke in a unanimous en banc published decision, arguably
invalidating ex parte contact by defense counsel. 160 The treating physician
153. Parker v. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc., No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-UPC, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 126565, at *13 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2009).
154. See id.
155. See, e.g. Leavitt v. Siems, 330 P.3d 1, 7-8 (Nev. 2014).
156. State v. Depoister, 25 P. 1000, 1003 (Nev. 1891) (quoting McKinney v. Grand
St., P.P. & F.R. Co., 10 N.E. 544, 544-45 (N.Y. 1887)).
157. Parker, No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-UPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126565, at *13;
see Foster v. Dingwall, 228 P.3d 453, 456 (Nev. 2010) (stating that federal interpretations
are only persuasive authority); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 123 (“An unpublished opinion or order
. . . shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited as legal authority.”).
158. Robeck v. Lunas Const. Clean-Up, Inc., No. 53576, 2011 WL 2139941, at *1
(Nev. May 27, 2011).
159. NEV. SUP. CT. R. 123.
160. Leavitt, 330 P.3d at 9.
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witness in Leavitt, however, was also designated as an expert. 161 The
question of whether defense counsel is permitted to contact the percipient
treating physician witness, who is not also designated as a trial expert for the
plaintiff in a case, has not yet been answered.
a. The Federal District Court Case: Parker v. Upsher-Smith
In Parker v. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc., 162 the plaintiff filed a lawsuit
against a drug manufacturer, Upsher-Smith Laboratories (“Upsher- Smith”),
claiming her husband died after ingesting Upsher-Smith’s antiarrhythmic
drug, amiodarone. 163 Defense counsel sent a letter informing the plaintiff
that they intended to interview some of the treating physicians in the case. 164
The plaintiff moved to prevent the defense from conducting the interviews,
arguing that such contact would violate Nevada’s patient-physician
privilege. 165
A magistrate judge found in favor of Upsher-Smith. 166 The judge found
first that many federal circuits allow ex parte interviews for sound policy
reasons, and second the plaintiff had waived her patient-privilege when she
filed suit and consequently there was nothing to prevent an ex parte
interview. 167 The magistrate judge ordered the parties to confer to ensure
that information outside the scope of the litigation, which may still be
privileged, would not be discussed in the interviews. 168 Later, one of the
plaintiff’s attorneys wrote to the treating physicians encouraging them to
refuse defense counsel’s requests to speak with them. 169 Defense counsel

161.
162.

Id. at 3.
No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-VPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12652 (D. Nev. Feb. 18,
2009) [hereinafter Parker (magistrate)].
163. Id. at *1-2.
164. Id. at *5-6.
165. Parker v. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc., No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-VPC, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 122770, *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Parker (case conference)].
166. Id.
167. Id. at *3. The magistrate permitted defense counsel to interview, ex parte, all six
of the plaintiff’s treating physicians in the case. Id. at *4-5.
168. The court further directed counsel “to meet and confer concerning reasonable
limitations on the scope of the ex parte physician interview”, and if they could not
resolve this issue, they were directed to file notices with the court, and a hearing would
be scheduled to decide this matter. Id. at *4-5.
169. Plaintiff’s counsel, faxed letters to the treating physicians stating in relevant part:
(1) that there was litigation between the parties; (2) that defense counsel sought
to have ex parte communications with the physicians regarding their treatment
of Mr. Parker; (3) that the Court had permitted defense counsel to contact the
physicians on an ex parte basis to discuss Mr. Parker’s care and treatment; (4)
that the physician was free to decide whether or not to meet privately with
defense counsel; and (5) that if the doctor decided to meet privately with
defense counsel, that Parker’s counsel would like to meet privately as well.
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reported the behavior and the magistrate sanctioned plaintiff’s counsel for
the interference. 170
A federal district court vacated the magistrate’s ruling. 171 Judge Edward
Reed consulted the amendment’s legislative history which he read as
indicating the legislature’s intention to bar defendant ex parte contact with
treating physicians. 172 The court acknowledged that a plaintiff indisputably
waives the privilege during deposition and trial testimony, and that filing a
lawsuit in Nevada effects a much broader waiver of the privilege than
merely the “written records” referenced in the “privilege-exception”
statute. 173 But the court nevertheless interpreted the amended statute as
imposing a complete ban on ex parte defense interviews, even though the
statute makes no mention of such a prohibition. 174
Parker ignored the lack of specific statutory language in holding that the
legislature intended to create a specific ban on defense counsel contacting
treating physicians regardless of whether a privilege is in effect. 175 As
previously discussed, the plain meaning of the statute’s language does not
indicate a ban on ex parte defense counsel contact. 176 If the legislature
intended to ban ex parte contact, it would have explicitly done just that when
drafting its amendment like other states that unambiguously prohibit such
contact. 177 Potential abuse during ex parte interviews can be prevented by
pre-interview policing as capably interposed by the magistrate in Parker,

Parker v. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc., No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-VPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
126565, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Parker (District Court)]. There is
legal authority which provides that neither HIPAA-compliant authorizations nor a court
order can force a healthcare professional to communicate with the attorneys. Parker
(magistrate), No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-UPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12652, at *2.
170. Parker (magistrate), No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-VPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12652, at *21-23.
171. Parker (District Court), No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-VPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
126565, at *13-15.
172. Id. at *10-14 (accepting plaintiff’s position that the amendments to the privilegeexception statute created an affirmative ban on ex parte defense counsel treating
physician interviews).
173. Id. at *10-11.
174. Id. at *14; see NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.245 (2014).
175. Parker (District Court), No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-VPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
126565, at *12-14.
176. See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.245.
177. See, e.g., id. § 49.235 (“1. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, by the
patient’s conservator, or by the personal representative of a deceased patient. 2. The
person who was the doctor may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient. The
person’s authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”).
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which is a method used in many other jurisdictions that permit defense ex
parte interviews. 178
Neither the amendment’s language to the exception statute nor the limited
legislative history behind it, nor the Parker court’s interpretation of
legislative intent are dispositive of whether ex parte defense interviews are
permitted. However, while there arguably remains no binding precedent, in
an unpublished opinion the Supreme Court of Nevada provided some
illumination on the ex parte debate. 179
b. Robeck v. Lunas and Leavit v. Siems: The Supreme Court of Nevada’s
First Foray into Defense Counsel Ex Parte Interviews
In 2011, the Supreme Court of Nevada adjudicated Robeck v. Lunas Const.
Clean-Up, Inc. which contemplated the defense counsel ex parte contact
issue. 180 This decision is unpublished, 181 but still offers important insight
into the Court’s perspective. 182
In Robeck, the plaintiff appealed a trial court’s dismissal of his medical
malpractice suit. 183 The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s insurance
company improperly contacted the plaintiffs treating physicians. 184 The
defendant admitted contacting, ex parte, the plaintiff’s treating physician,
but only for the purpose of requesting medical documents and to coordinate
a deposition. 185 Notably, the plaintiff did not dispute defendant’s intentions
which concerned only logistical matters. 186 Legally relevant written

178. Parker (District Court), No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-VPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
126565, at *4-6.
179. Robeck v. Lunas Const. Clean-Up, Inc., No. 53576, 2011 WL 2139941, at *1
(Nev. May 27, 2011).
180. Id.
181. See NEV. SUP. CT. R. 123 (stating that “[a]n unpublished opinion or order . . .
shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited as legal authority”).
182. The decision is a valid order from the Supreme Court which presented the
reasoning of the justices and contains probative value for purposes of predicting Nevada
law on this issue. It is also common practice to cite unpublished opinions as persuasive
notice of the Nevada Supreme Court’s thinking, although it cannot be used as the basis
for rulings. NEV. SUP. CT. R. 123. Whether Robeck was indeed a harbinger of things to
come depends on how one interprets the Supreme Court’s second trip into the discussion
described below. See generally Leavitt v. Simms, 330 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2014).
183. Robeck, No. 53576, 2011 WL 2139941, at *1.
184. In addition to the allegation that defense counsel wrongfully contacted the
plaintiff’s treating physicians ex parte, the plaintiff also argued that Robeck’s treating
physicians gave false testimony, and that defense counsel made improper statements in
his opening and closing arguments. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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documents constituted the only substantive information that changed hands
as specifically permitted by the privilege-exception statute. 187
When the court referred to Nevada’s privilege-exception statute, it stated
that “[b]ecause Robeck’s condition was an element of his claim against [the
defendant], [the defendant] did not violate Robeck’s medical privacy by
contacting his physicians to obtain information regarding Robeck’s
condition.” 188 In stark contrast from the court in Parker, the court in Robeck
held that defense counsel was permitted to secure “information regarding
Robeck’s condition” through an ex parte interview. 189 In short, Robeck’s
language, although perhaps dictum because the disclosure during the
interview contained no substantive information, suggested the Supreme
Court of Nevada would permit ex parte interviews as long as the defendant
is “contacting . . . physicians to obtain information . . .” about a “condition
[that is] an element of [the plaintiff’s] claim against [the defendant].”190
The Nevada Supreme Court created more ambiguity about ex parte
contact when deciding Leavitt v. Siems. 191 In Leavitt, a plaintiff designated a
treating physician as an expert. 192 The defendant’s attorney contacted the
treating physician to “schedule and coordinate the trial testimony.” 193 On
appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court, now in a published decision, held that ex
parte communications with a plaintiff’s treating physician, where the
treating physician is designated as an expert, is improper. 194
The court reviewed case law from around the country, noting that
authorities disagree about the propriety of ex parte contacts with treating
physicians. 195 The court then turned to Nevada’s expert-discovery case law,
noting that the “Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure affirmatively allow only
formal depositions of experts.” 196 The court determined that “ex parte
communication with an opposing party’s expert witness is improper.” 197
Notably, the court carefully limited the holding’s scope to treating
physicians designated as experts and relied heavily on expert-discovery case
law and rules in its decision. 198 However, Leavitt did not answer the

187.
188.
189.

Id.
Robeck, No. 53576, 2011 WL 2139941, at *1 (emphasis added).
Id. (making no mention of a distinction between substantive and non-substantive
information).
190. Id. (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.245(3) (2012)).
191. Leavitt v. Simms, 330 P.3d, 1 8 (Nev. 2014).
192. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 6.
194. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 7.
196. Id. at 7.
197. Leavitt, 330 P.3d at 3 (emphasis added).
198. See generally id.
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question of whether ex parte contact with a treating provider who is merely a
percipient witness is in fact permitted.
Despite the limitation of its holding to contact with physicians who are
designated as experts, the court in dicta expressed its disapproval of ex parte
contacts with treating physicians. 199 The court mused, for example, that “ex
parte discussions tend to place the physician in the position of having to
make legal conclusions about the scope of the privilege and the relevancy of
the material requested”. 200 The court also recognized that ex parte
discussions expose treating physicians to tort liability. 201 The court also
notes the potential that “defense counsel may seek to improperly influence . .
. or may discourage the physician from testifying.” 202 Additionally, the
court did not discuss any benefits that could result from controlled, proper ex
parte interviews—stating simply that “it is undisputed that ex parte
conferences yield no greater evidence, nor do they provide any additional
information, than that which is already obtainable through the regular
methods of discovery.” 203
Neither Leavitt nor Robeck answer the ex parte interview question
definitively. Robeck, even if it were binding precedent, leaves open the
possibility that these interviews could be restricted to the discussion of
document production, scheduling, or other logistical matters. 204 Nor does
Robeck appear to foreclose the possibility that even if permitted, ex parte
defense interviews must be preceded by some form of agreement by the
parties or court order regarding the permissible scope of the contact. 205
Leavitt contains strong language indicating that the court dislikes ex parte
treating physician interviews—and where the treating physicians are
designated as experts, the law is now clear that contacts are prohibited. But,
the court appears to have carefully restricted its holding to the expert
context, and thus the area of law remains uncertain. 206

199.
200.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8 (quoting King v. Ahrens, 798 F. Supp. 1371, 1373 (W.D. Ark. 1992),
aff’d 16 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 1994)).
201. Id.
202. Leavitt, 330 P.3d at 8.
203. Id. (quoting Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 722, 727 (Tenn.
2006)).
204. Even though, as discussed in note 189, the court does not address the
substantive/non-substantive distinction, it can be argued that the holding would be dictum
as to the question of substantive communications. However, the court’s reasoning would
seem to apply to all communications. See generally Leavitt, 330 P.3d at 3.
205. If there was substantive information changing hands, the court may have applied
reasoning in line with the magistrate in the Parker case, finding that some agreement as
to permissible scope should be reached prior to any interviews. See Parker (District
Court), No. 3:06-CV-518-ECR-UPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126565, at *5-6.
206. Leavitt, 330 P.3d at 3.

68

The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy

Vol. 31:1

Nevada law is a perfect example of the two reasons a more comprehensive
solution to ex parte interviews with treating physicians is needed. First, the
law is unclear. 207 Litigators cannot determine if interviews are permitted
and, considering the negative language in the few decisions on point, more
attorneys will likely avoid such contacts. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, courts fails to acknowledge policy interests that recognizes the
benefits of a system where reasonably controlled ex parte contact is
permitted. 208
E. AN ATTEMPT AT A UNIFORM APPROACH THAT BALANCES THE
IMPORTANT POLICY ARGUMENTS AND BRINGS NEEDED CONSISTENCY
1. Critical Components to a Solution
Any effort to reform the standards for ex parte treating physician
interviews must address three aspects of the problem. First, the procedural
mechanism for reform should be carefully selected. Second, the optimal
solution will balance the competing policy interests of the plaintiff and
defense bars, and also account for the interests of physicians. Third, reform
should result in definitive standards so that attorneys and physicians know
how to conduct themselves in requesting, scheduling, and conducting ex
parte defense interviews. 209
First, at least two potential mechanisms are available for creating new ex
parte interview standards. Legislatures could enact statutes explicitly
dealing with the ex parte interview issue by defining the extent to which the
patient privilege is waived by the initiation of a lawsuit. A model statute is
offered at the conclusion of this article which attempts to balance the
competing policy perspectives. 210 Legislative solutions offer certainty and
are the most binding form of legal standard. 211 However, legislative fixes
may be difficult to accomplish due to political challenges. 212

207.
208.
209.

See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.215-.245 (2014).
Id.
See generally Philip H. Corboy, Ex Parte Contacts Between Plaintiff’s Physician
and Defense Attorneys: Protecting the Patient-Litigant’s Right to a Fair Trial, 21 LOY.
U. CHI. L. J. 1001, 1012-19 (1990) (discussing the balancing necessary within a statute.)
210. See infra pp. 38-39.
211. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 19 (1824); Robert Hajdu & Bruce E.
Rosenblum, The Process of Constitutional Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 106, 161-62
(1979).
212. Michael D. Sant’ Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach
Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1391 (2011).
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Another option would be to adopt local rules or practices on point. 213
Likely, the best approach would involve a model standard that could be
adopted into local rules. 214 The benefit of this approach would be to give
discretion to local authorities to craft a solution tailored to their locale. 215
However, local judicial rulemakers’ freedom to vary the terms of the
standard might undermine the effort to achieve uniformity. 216 If politically
viable, a legislative fix therefore is arguably a superior solution.
2. A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Ex Parte Defense Interview Issue
Whether by legislation or court rule, the solution must balance the policies
outlined in Section II. 217 The solution should give defense counsel
meaningful ex parte access to treating physicians in order to provide equal
access to relevant information without incurring the expense, delay and
strategic disadvantage of depositions. At the same time, the solution should
protect the plaintiff’s privileged medical information from inadvertent—or
purposeful—disclosure beyond that inherent in and necessary to the
litigation process. 218 The solution also should include protections for the
physician, by preventing defense counsel from exerting undue influence on
the treating physician during the interview process, and giving the doctor a
clear answer to her questions about whether the requested interview is
required or permitted at all, the permissible scope of the interview, and the
extent to which she may inform her patient or the patient’s lawyer about the
interview request. The solution should ensure not only that lawyers for both
sides have easy access to the treating physician for ministerial matters such
as verifying data and scheduling depositions but also should permit defense

213.
214.

Id.
Janet Napolitano, A Comment on Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules:
Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. LEV. 2063,
2065 (1989).
215. See Jodi S. Balsam, The New Second Circuit Local Rules: Anatomy and
Commentary, 19 J. L. & POL’Y 469, 538 (2011) (discussing the nature of local rules).
216. Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a
Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through A Collaborative Rule-Making Process,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (2005) (discussing the “balkanization” of procedural rules
as a result of modifications made through local rules and court orders).
217. See supra, Section IV.
218. The authors have been unable to find any reliable evidence regarding the extent
of purposeful defense counsel abuse of treating physician interviews. Moreover, most
commentators and judges do not raise significant concerns over purposeful abuse. Thus,
this policy concern is not included in the predicates for reform. See Barbara P. Berens,
Defendant’s Rights to Conduct Ex Parte Interviews with Treating Physicians in Drug or
Medical Device Cases, 73 MINN. L. REV 1451, 1452, 1474 (1989).
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counsel a fair opportunity, with the physician’s knowledge and consent, to
ask substantive questions about the case during the interview. 219
We offer the following proposal to address these fundamental needs.
First, we propose an explicit privilege waiver. This ensures that defense
counsel will not be liable under a privilege theory for contacting treating
physicians. 220 Second, defense counsel are explicitly given authority to
interview treating physicians on substantive matters—subject to the
procedural safeguards discussed below. This explicit authority to conduct
interviews removes any doubt that the practice is allowed; a problem for
counsel in jurisdictions that regulate ex parte defense interviews without a
statute—such as Nevada. 221 Third, even where a plaintiff has legitimate
concerns about a defense counsel interviewing a treating physician, our
proposed solution carves out a safe harbor to save costs by allowing counsel
to discuss non-substantive issues such as scheduling. Finally, a safe harbor
is given to the treating physicians to ensure they may speak with defense
counsel without fear of exposure to liability or censure from their licensing
authorities. Our proposed solution focuses on ensuring adequate safeguards
protect plaintiffs’ interests. 222 This is achieved by enumerating the steps
defense counsel must comply with in order to carry out the interview. 223
One provision allows the plaintiff to seek a protective order specifically
delineating what topics the treating physician may discuss—upon the
plaintiff making a sufficient showing that there is a “significant likelihood”
of inadvertent disclosure of privileged information. A protective order is
available where plaintiff demonstrates reasonable concerns that the treating
physician may have trouble figuring out what information she is permitted to
disclose even after the defense counsel complies with the procedural
safeguards. 224 Our proposed solution incorporates a number of provisions
ensuring that the treating physician is informed of the proper topics of the
interview and of her option not to participate. The statute also requires
proper notice to the plaintiff so that in the event there is a reasonable basis to
restrict ex parte contact, plaintiff’s counsel has an adequate opportunity to
seek protection from the court. One provision also requires that defense
counsel memorialize the topics that were discussed so that plaintiff’s counsel
will be able to review the interview record if needed.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Samms v. Dist. Ct., 908 P.2d 520, 526 (Colo. 1995) (en banc).
See supra section III.A.
See generally supra section V.A.
See supra section IV.A.
Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857, 864-65 (N.J. 1985) (discussing court
supervision of ex parte interviews).
224. Whitney B. Hayes, Physician-Patient Confidentiality in Health Care Liability
Actions: HIPAA’S Preemption of Ex Parte Interviews with Treating Physicians Through
the Obstacle Test, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 97, 108 (2013).

2015]

Navigating the Law of Defense Counsel Ex Parte Interviews

71

To address these concerns, the authors propose the following model
statute:
Waiver of the patient-physician privilege when asserting claims or
defenses.
Subject to subsection (b), a person waives the patientphysician privilege by asserting a claim or defense in which
the person’s medical condition is placed at issue.
The scope of the waiver in section (a)(1) is not unlimited but
shall extend only to the subject matter relevant to the person’s
claims or defenses.
Ex parte interviews of a party’s treating physician by opposing
party; protective orders; exceptions.
In general.— In any case in which a party has placed his or
her medical condition at issue, the opposing party shall be
permitted to contact the party’s treating physician if the
opposing party first does each of the following:
informs the treating physician of the specific subject
matter that is not privileged, such as by waiver, and
therefore permissible to discuss;
informs the treating physician that any personal medical
information, other than that pertaining to the nonprivileged subject matter identified in subsection a,
should not be discussed;
informs the treating physician that the physician may
refuse to speak in the non-testimonial setting to the party
or his or her counsel for any reason;
informs the treating physician of his or her right to be
compensated for his or her time;
informs the treating physician of his or her right to
notify the patient and his or her attorney of the interview
in advance;
provides notice to counsel of record for the opposing
party, or the opposing party if there is no counsel of
record, by no later than 24 hours before the interview;
informs the treating physician of his or her right to
consult with his or her own counsel in connection with
the interview; and,
memorializes what is discussed in the interview in
written or recorded form, and provides it upon request to
the physician.
Notwithstanding section (1), a party may seek a protective order
from the court which limits the subject matter of an opposing party
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interview with a treating physician, upon a showing that there is a
significant likelihood that the patient’s privileged information may
be disclosed.
Notwithstanding section (1) or section (2), a party may contact a
treating physician for procedural matters, such as scheduling a
deposition, requesting mailing information, or requesting
information pertaining to the physician’s status as a treating
physician.
Protection of treating physicians who participate in interviews
with counsel for opposing parties.
No treating physician shall be liable for participating in
interviews with counsel for opposing parties if the physician
acted in good faith.
The above proposed statute attempts to reconcile concerns about granting
unfettered access to plaintiffs’ physicians with concerns that defense counsel
will be unfairly prevented from using efficient, cost-effective means to
gather relevant information from treating physicians. The statute further
protects the physician from undue pressure by ensuring that he or she will
give full, informed consent to any ex parte interviews with defense counsel.
While this solution may not be perfect for every jurisdiction, it provides a
starting point for legislatures, and judges, to begin considering mechanisms
that balance the many legitimate policy interests raised by the ex parte
treating physician issue.
CONCLUSION
While the proposed statute above may not ultimately prove to be the ex
parte defense interview silver bullet, the point of this article is to highlight
the significant policy issues raised by both sides of the bar, and the
importance of crafting a solution that balances these interests, along with
those of the physician witnesses at the center of the debate. The state of the
law across the nation remains haphazard, and courts and legislatures regulate
ex parte defense interviews in myriad ways.
Amidst the confusion, however, one truth that should be clear: that there
are fair, measured approaches to permitting and regulating ex parte defense
counsel interviews while promote the just and efficient administration of
cases while adequately protecting plaintiffs’ interests. Ex parte defense
interviews are not prohibited by privilege or HIPAA, and, properly
governed, they need not be adverse to plaintiffs’ right and interests
generally.
With that said, careful thought needs to be given when crafting any
regulatory framework applicable to ex parte defense interviews. Adequate
assurance should be given to ensure that the boundaries of plaintiffs’
privileges are observed, that defense counsel do not take advantage of the
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process to obtain information to which counsel is not entitled, and that
treating physicians are able to fulfill their role in their patients’ legal cases
without fear of being sued or subjected to discipline from their own
licensing boards.
Rising litigation costs, particularly in the medical malpractice context,
should lead all concerned to embrace this opportunity to make the process
more efficient and streamlined. Ex parte defense interviews clearly serve
this policy, and plaintiffs’ interests—while important—can be protected.

